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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Thomas T. Melvin, Jr. appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct. Melvin claims, for the first time on 
appeal, that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by 
allegedly misstating the evidence. Melvin also claims the district court abused its 
sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Melvin with lewd conduct with a minor under 16 for 
having genital-to-genital contact with ten-year-old Z.G. (R. 1 , pp.8-9, 20-21.) 
Melvin pied not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.22, 31-39.) The 
jury found Melvin guilty of lewd conduct and the court imposed a unified 12-year 
sentence with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.2 (R., pp.43, 63-64.) 
Melvin timely appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.66-67.) 
1 Page citations to the record in this case correspond to the electronic page 
number, not the handwritten page number. 
2 At the conclusion of the review period, the court relinquished jurisdiction and 
ordered Melvin's sentence executed. (Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and 
Imposing Sentence, filed January 9, 2015 (file folder).) 
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ISSUES 
Melvin states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of 
fundamental error, by arguing facts not in evidence? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed 
upon Mr. Melvin a sentence that is excessive given any view 
of the facts? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Melvin failed to show prosecutorial misconduct, much less 
misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error? 
2. Has Melvin failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing a unified 12-year sentence, with five years fixed, upon the jury 
verdict finding Melvin guilty of lewd conduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Melvin Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His 
Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal Melvin argues that the prosecutor made 
statements during closing argument that constituted prosecutorial misconduct 
and amounted to fundamental error. Specifically, he contends that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing facts that were not in evidence. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-11.) This claim is without merit. A review of the 
challenged remarks shows no misconduct, much less misconduct rising to the 
level of fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Whether the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 
Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). 
C. Melvin Has Failed To Show Any Prosecutorial Misconduct, Much Less 
Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error 
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes 
fundamental error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 
(Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to 
remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the 
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defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right 
a fair trial in a fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 
976 (2010). Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant 
demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights 
were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, 
"without the need for any additional information" including information "as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must 
demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally 
by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the 
trial proceedings." 1J:L. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Melvin argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level 
of fundamental error by using the words "grabbed" and "led" during closing 
argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9.) Melvin, however, has failed to show error, 
much less fundamental error. Indeed, a review of the record and the applicable 
law shows that the arguments singled out are entirely proper and, as such, 
Melvin has failed to satisfy even the first prong of the fundamental error analysis. 
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument, and is entitled 
to argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record. State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009). If a prosecutor 
"attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the 
jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's 
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial," and may be reviewed for 
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fundamental error. State v. Beeks, 2015 WL 4079448 (Idaho App. July 2015) 
(quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979). 
In this case, Melvin contends the prosecutor misstated the evidence by 
using the words "grabbed" and "led" during his closing argument. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.7-11.) According to Melvin, such language misstated the evidence and 
evidences the prosecutors "clear" efforts "to prove the intent element based on 
evidence that was not in the record." (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9.) Melvin is 
incorrect. 
In order to provide context, the prosecutor's comments must be reviewed 
in light of the entire trial. During opening statements, the prosecutor told the jury 
that Z.G. would testify 
that on July 18th , 2013, about 1:00 a.m., Mr. Melvin came into her 
bedroom and asked her to go somewhere, and he takes her --
leads her out of the bedroom. They start to leave the house. He 
tells her to get a blanket, which you'll see later was a Tinkerbell 
children's blanket. She grabbed her blanket, and they left their 
house. You'll hear her state also that when they left the house it 
was dark outside. That Mr. Melvin led her across the street, 
through an alley, over to an unfinished home in Grangeville, 
probably, oh, two, 300 feet away from their home. That Mr. Melvin 
led [her] into this unfinished home where - where you'll hear 
testimony nobody was living there. It was unfinished. It was under 
construction. That he leads her into the home, up some steps, into 
a room in this unfinished home. That he then lays down a tent, just 
a regular camping tent, pretty good size tent, lays that down on the 
floor of one of the unfinished rooms and leads [Z.G.] over to that 
area. She'll then testify that he took his clothes off -- all of his 
clothes, and then took all of her clothes off, and that then he places 
her on top of him. She'll testify that, again, they were both naked. 
That her vagina touched his penis for about a minute, and then she 
asked him to get off - get off from being on top of her. He did. 
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(Supp. Tr. 3 , p.62, L.5 - p.63, L.5.) 
Defense counsel responded to the prosecutor's opening statement by 
agreeing that the testimony the jury would hear would be "exactly what" the 
prosecutor said and indicated that he did not "dispute that the witnesses in this 
case are going to say what [the prosecutor] said." (Supp. Tr., p.69, Ls.11-14.) 
Consistent with what the prosecutor outlined in his opening statement, 
and what defense counsel agreed would be said, Z.G. testified that Melvin led4 
her across the street to an unfinished home and engaged in lewd conduct with 
her. On direct examination, Z.G. testified: 
Q. Was there a time on -- sometime in the morning of July 18th , 
2013, that ... Mr. Melvin came to your bedroom? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you remember about what time that was? 
A. No. 
Q. Would it be in the early morning? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And what did he do when he came into your bedroom? 
A. He got me up, and then he told me to get a blanket, so I did. 
And then I went out to ... the front room. He grabbed the tent and 
some other stuff, and then he took me out of the house. 
3 There are two transcripts included in the record on appeal. The transcript 
including the evidence presented at trial and the sentencing hearing will be 
referred to as "Tr.," and the transcript containing the opening statements, closing 
arguments, as well as other proceedings will be referred to as "Supp. Tr." 
4 Because the word "lead" fairly and accurately describes what Melvin did in 
relation to removing Z.G. from the home, the state will continue to use the word 
"led" despite Melvin's position that the word is objectionable on the facts of this 
case. 
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Q. Okay. So, did he ask you to get a blanket? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then he took a tent with him, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then when he took you outside where did you go? 
A. Across the road. 
Q. And then after you crossed the road where did you go? 
A. Into this unfinished house. 
Q. It was being built; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did your -- did Mr. Melvin take you into that unfinished 
house? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did he take you into one of the rooms? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened when he took you into one of the rooms? 
A. He laid out ... the part that you put under the tent, and he laid it 
down, and the he told me to lay down. So, I got my blanket down, 
and then I covered up under it, and then he took off my clothes, 
and then he took off his. 
Q. At any point did you get on top of him, or did he get on top of 
you? 
A. He got on top of me. 
(Tr., p. 1 0, L. 1 9 - p. 12, L. 1 0.) 
Z.G. then testified that Melvin touched his penis to her vagina, for about 
one minute, until Z.G. told him to get off of her. (Tr., p.12, L.11 - p.13, 16.) 
7 
Z.G. told Melvin she wanted to go home because it was cold and dark, but 
Melvin did not want to go, so Z.G. stayed for a while longer, but eventually left at 
which time she encountered an officer who was searching for her because her 
mother reported her and Melvin missing. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-20, p.32, L.18-p.34, 
L.11, p.74, L.11 - p.76, L.25.) Z.G. also testified that, before the abuse 
occurred, Melvin took her to "an area to get a drink" of water and told her to stay 
by a van while he took a handful of pills that he got from some prescription 
bottles he had with him. (Tr., p.13, L.17 - p.14, L.2, p.30, L.14 - p.31, L. 15, 
p.43, Ls.6-25.) 
During closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the evidence that 
supported a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Melvin touched Z.G. with 
sexual intent. (Supp. Tr., p.97, L.14- p.101, L.1.) The prosecutor stated: 
First of all, let's look at the time that this happened. 1 :00 a.m. in 
the morning Mr. Melvin goes into [Z.G.'s] bedroom to get her up, 
and then he -- before he leaves he asks her to get a blanket. Well, 
what was his intent there? You decide. Why does he want her to 
bring a blanket over there? Also, he bring[s a] tent. He brings - he 
brings this tent that was laid out. Does that go to his intent? I 
would argue that it does. Why does a person bring a tent over to a 
secluded home? It goes to what his intent was. He takes [Z.G.] to 
a secluded location, an unfinished home, a home under 
construction, where nobody is living. It's not finished. The 
testimony was it was dark, dark in there. He takes her -- he takes 
her, I would submit, to a place that nobody can see what's going 
on. That goes to his intent, his intent to arouse his sexual desires. 
Once he gets to the secluded room he puts the tent on the floor. 
He gets -- he takes his clothes off, and he takes [Z.G.'s] clothes off. 
What does that show? That shows his intent, his intent to commit 
a sexual act with [Z.G.], an intent to arouse his sexual desires. 
What other meaning could that have, to take your clothes off and 
take [Z.G.'s] clothes off? There is no other purpose for that other 
than the intent to arouse your desires. He lays on top of her. What 
does that go to? I mean, he's naked. She's naked. He lays on top 
of her. I mean, what other intent, a naked man laying on a 10 or an 
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11-year-old child, what other intent is there? It's clear. And he lays 
on top of her not just for a second, for a minute. Her testimony was 
for a minute. That he lays on top of her, and not just lays on top of 
her, his penis touches her vagina for that minute. That was the 
testimony . . . . What does that show you? What intent does that 
show to you? And I would ask you to use your own common 
sense, your own -- your own learning in life, what you know about 
life, you know, ·use that. What does all these [sic] things show? It 
show what his intent was. This wasn't an accident, I would submit 
to you. It wasn't an accident that he took his clothes off. It wasn't 
an accident that he took her clothes off. It wasn't an accident that 
he laid on top of her for a minute. It wasn't an accident that his 
penis touched her vagina for a minute. That's not an accident. 
Another factor, Exhibit No. 22, this is what's called KY Jelly. 
And you heard -- you heard [an officer] state what that is; that that's 
a personal lubricant for sexual activity, basically, is what he testified 
to. I would ask you to look at these when you go back to the jury 
room. The purple one says mine, and then underneath that it says 
for her. The blue one says yours, for him, personal lubricant. You 
can read what the purpose is for that, and I would submit to you, 
why does - why does an adult male bring this personal sexual 
lubricant with him to a secluded home in the dark and do all these 
things and have that? ... 
I would submit to you, any one of these -- I've told you 10 
different circumstances which indicate intent, and I would submit to 
you, any one of those shows what his intent was on its own. And 
you add all 10 of those together, it's just -- it's overwhelming what 
the circumstantial evidence is regarding his intent, what as in his 
mind when he does all these things. It's -- there's no other 
explanation for it, and you have no other explanation. It can only 
mean one thing, and that's he led her over there, did all these 
things, brought the lubricant, to arouse his sexual interest, his 
sexual desires. 
(Supp. Tr., p.97, L.21 - p.101, L.1 (emphasis added).) 
Melvin's claim of misconduct is based, in part, on the italicized sentence 
above, cited without context, with an emphasis on the phrase, "he led her over 
there." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Melvin relies on this sentence in conjunction with 
three other snippets from the prosecutor's closing remarks as evidence of the 
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prosecutor's alleged malfeasance. The other snippets Melvin cites are detailed 
below. 
In discussing Instruction No. 12 regarding voluntary intoxication, the 
prosecutor explained: 
But the only evidence was that [Z.G.], at one point I believe they 
had gone across the street and he had gotten a drink of water, and 
she said that he picked up some pills and took those pills, a 
handful of pills. But there's one - I think some interesting points 
about that. My recollection of [Z.G.'s] testimony -- there was 
actually two parts to that. On direct examination she testified that 
Mr. Melvin took -- basically took her, led her over to the house, or 
they walked together over to the house with the tent and the 
blanket, and when they get to the house they go inside. He puts 
the tent down. He does all these things that I've already described, 
that you've heard. He gets on top. Has the genital to genital 
contact. She says to get off after about a minute, and he does. My 
recollection of her testimony on direct examination was, that then at 
that point they both walk over, back over to were her house is. And 
I believe it was either her house or a neighbor's house. He goes to 
a hose. Gets a drink out of the hose. Takes the handful of pills, 
but what's important about that testimony is that that happened, 
him taking the pills happened after the genital to genital contact 
already happened. So, it happened right from the very beginning. 
So, any effect those pills -- the pills were taken after the act, so 
they wouldn't have had any effect on his mind anyway. 
Now, I think on cross-examination, I think there was a little 
bit of a change to that, where she said - she clarified that she 
believed that they had gone to the house the first time, I believe, 
and then went over across the street and he had the -- he took a 
drink from the hose, then took the handful of pills. Then went right 
back -- right back to the home, and then that's when the act 
occurred. So, there was a little bit of difference there, but I would 
submit to you either version from her on that testimony still shows 
that any pills that he took wouldn't have any effect on him, because 
if you believe the version that was brought up in cross-examination, 
that they went to the home and them Mr. Melvin decided he wanted 
to go get a drink .... And he went and got the drink, and then they 
immediately ... went back to the home, and then the sexual act 
occurred . . .. So, if you believe that version -- again, the taking of 
the pills happened within a minute or two of the commission of the 
sexual act. So, use your own common sense, life experiences, 
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whether you think the pills would have any effect on him within a 
minute or two of taking them. 
(Supp. , p.103, L.20 - p.105, 1 (emphasis added).) 
At the conclusion of his closing, in asking the jury to return a guilty verdict, 
the prosecutor stated: 
I would ask you to please look at those instructions when 
you go back there. I think obviously the intent issue here is 
probably the main issue. Please consider -- consider everything 
that you heard yesterday regarding the intent and all these things 
and the KY Jelly and all the things Mr. Melvin did. When you think 
about this, it was planned out. This was planned. You grab a 
child. You take her in the dark. You got to a secluded home. You 
do all these things. You get naked. You get her naked. You get 
on top of her. It's all planned. Is he able to physically do all these 
things? Yes. No problems whatsoever. Is he able to instruct her 
to go get a blanket? Yes. No problems. It's all planned. It's all 
clear, and it's beyond any doubt. Based upon all that, ladies and 
gentlemen, I would ask you to find Mr. Melvin guilty of lewd conduct 
with a minor child. 
(Supp. Tr., p.108, L.11 - p.109, L.2 (emphasis added).) 
Finally, in rebuttal, in response to defense counsel's argument that Melvin 
lacked intent because he was "sleepwalking" during the incident, the prosecutor 
said: 
Use your common sense. Can you do all the things that Mr. Melvin 
did. Wake up [at] 1 :00 a.m. Go to your stepdaughter's bedroom. 
Get her up. Go - and as you - before you leave the house you tell 
this child, get a blanket, the Tinkerbell blanket. [Z.G.], get a 
blanket. He didn't mumble when he said that. He didn't trip over 
his words. He said, go get a blanket. She goes. She gets a 
blanket. Is that planning? He says there's no evidence that was 
planning. This is what they call circumstantial evidence. Use your 
own common sense, life experiences. Is it planning to [say], [Z.G.], 
go get a blanket? He grabs this tent from the house. Is that 
planning? Yes, that's planning. That goes -- is that important? It 
goes to intent. What was his intent in doing all these things? Can 
you do this sleepwalking? Grab the tent. Tells [Z.G.] to get the 
blanket. Grab the fly, which was not attached to the tent when they 
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found it. Carry those. Bring the black case with the KY Jelly. Why 
is that over there? Does that go to intent? Absolutely. Is that 
planning? Absolutely. 
You'll be able to take these photos back to the jury room. 
He takes the girl, leads her down the steps. Can you do that 
sleepwalking? Leads her across the street, though a gravel 
alleyway, over to a rocky area where she said she was scared. 
There was big rocks. Then there were smaller walks [sic]. That 
she was scared where she was walking. It was dark. She was 
scared she would trip. Walk through those rocks, this rocky area. 
Walk into this garage of this unfinished home. Walk up these 
stairs, all in the dark. Walk into this room. Take the tent, lay the 
tent on the ground. Not sure where the blanket was. The KY is 
down by his feet in a case. Take all your clothes off .... Take 
[Z.G.'s] clothes off. Get on top of her for a minute. Put your penis 
on her vagina for a minute until she finally says, stop. You only 
have your common sense, your life experiences. Can you do all 
that sleepwalking? And does that show intent? Absolutely, that 
shows intent. 
(Supp. Tr., p.120, L.22-p.122, L.12 (emphasis added).) 
In arguing that "none of th[e] statements" italicized above "were supported 
by evidence adduced at trial," Melvin relies on the following excerpts from 
defense counsel's cross-examination of Z.G.: 
Q. And where did you get the blanket from? 
A My bed. 
Q. Your bed. Okay, and did he tell you where to go with the 
blanket? 
A No. 
Q. Okay. But you went to the front room? 
A Yes. 
Q. Okay. Did he push you into the front room, pull you in -- hold 
your hand? 
A No, I walked. 
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(Tr., p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.7 (cited in Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9).) 
Q. Okay. And at that point you left the house; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, and did [Melvin] tell you where you were supposed to 
go? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Did he lead you by the hand? 
A. No. 
Q. Push you in a direction? 
A. No. 
(Tr., p.25, Ls.11-20 (cited in Appellant's Brief, p.9).) 
Melvin contends, for the first time on appeal, that because Z.G. denied 
Melvin "pushed her, led her, told her where to go, or held her hand," the 
prosecutor could not use the words "led" or "grab" in his closing arguments. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Melvin's argument ignores what is obvious from the 
context of the prosecutor's statements as well as the actual definition of the word 
"lead" (or "led"). The definition of the word "lead" includes "to guide on a way 
especially by going in advance"; "to direct on a course or in a direction"; "to guide 
someone or something along a way"; "to be first." www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/lead. Both a common understanding of the word lead in 
the manner the prosecutor used it and the word's definition support the 
conclusion that it was an appropriate word to describe Melvin's behavior in this 
case. That Melvin has decided on appeal that the prosecutor intended some 
other meaning is unsupported by the record and his assertion that the 
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prosecutor's use of the word deprived him of his right to a fair trial is, at best, 
disingenuous. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d 414, 439 
(2009) (appellate courts will not "lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an 
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting 
through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less 
damaging interpretations"). 
Melvin's argument that the prosecutor's single use of the word "grab" in 
referring to Z.G. constitutes misconduct also fails. Reading the prosecutor's 
statements as a whole does not support Melvin's assertion that the prosecutor 
used the word "grab" in some nefarious way in order to prove intent. Although 
Z.G. did not testify that Melvin physically grabbed her, it is apparent from the 
context that the prosecutor was not arguing such. Rather, the word was used in 
the non-literal sense to communicate that Melvin took, or led, Z.G. out of the 
house and across the street where he engaged in lewd conduct. Melvin's claim 
that the prosecutor "attempted to convince the jury" that Melvin "had specific 
intent to sexually abuse Z.G." by misstating the evidence is without merit. 
Even if Melvin could satisfy the first prong of Perry, his argument does not 
survive scrutiny under the second or third prongs because the error he 
complains of is not clear on the record and the alleged error, if any, is harmless. 
With respect to the second prong, the error is not plain from the record because, 
contrary to the applicable legal standards, it requires the Court to interpret the 
prosecutor's word choice in the most damaging way. Severson, supra. Further, 
it assumes there was no strategic reason for counsel not to object even though 
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there are several reasons counsel may have declined to do so. For example, 
counsel may have elected not to object because he did not assign the most 
damaging meaning to the prosecutor's word, or because the prosecutor's choice 
of words did not undermine Melvin's sleepwalking defense, or because defense 
counsel did not think an objection was warranted under the circumstances. On 
appeal, Melvin offers no substantive argument that he met his burden under the 
second prong of Perry. Instead, he asserts, in conclusory fashion: "[t]hese due 
process violations are apparent from the face of the record and are clear 
violations of well-established law." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Stating the error is 
"clear" does not make it so, and falls far short of Melvin's burden of showing the 
error he alleges is "clear or obvious" "without the need for any additional 
information" including information "as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Finally, Melvin has failed to meet is burden of showing the statements he 
complains of affected the outcome of the proceedings. First, the court instructed 
the jury that "[t]he arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence" 
(Supp. Tr., p.87, Ls.9-10), which cured any alleged error. State v. Abdullah, 158 
Idaho 386, _, 348 P.3d 1, 59 (2015). Second, as Melvin concedes on appeal, 
his "entire defense" was premised on his claim that he was sleepwalking and, 
therefore, did not have the requisite intent (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The jury 
obviously rejected this defense and, based on the evidence presented, would 
have done so with or without the prosecutor's use of the words "led" or "grab" in 
relation to Z.G. Further, the prosecutor's discussion of intent did not hinge solely 
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on the assertion that Melvin led and/or grabbed Z.G. and took her across the 
street. The prosecutor catalogued a number of actions taken by Melvin, which 
Melvin did not dispute, that supported a finding that he had the requisite intent. 
These actions included telling Z.G. to bring a blanket with her, and Melvin 
bringing a tent and KY Jelly, taking Z.G. to a secluded area outside of the home 
in the middle of the night, telling Z.G. to remove her clothes, taking off his own 
clothes, and putting his penis on Z.G.'s vagina until she told him to stop. (Supp. 
Tr., p.120, L.11 - p.122, L.24.) This conduct, even without using the words "led," 
"lead," or "grab" support the jury's finding that Melvin was guilty of lewd conduct. 
A review of the record shows Melvin has failed to meet his burden of 
showing error under any prong of Perry. 
11. 
Melvin Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A Introduction 
Melvin contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing a 
unified 12 year sentence with five years fixed. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) More 
specifically, Melvin argues his sentence is excessive given his "relatively minor 
criminal history," "mental illness," the "unusual" facts of this case, and "the fact 
that his psychosexual evaluation places him at a moderate low risk to reoffend." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) To the contrary, the district court acted well within 
its discretion and consistent with the objectives of sentencing; Melvin has failed 
to meet his burden of showing otherwise. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
A district court's sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27,218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Imposing 
A Unified 12-Year Sentence, With Five Years Fixed, Upon The Jury 
Verdict Finding Melvin Guilty Of Lewd Conduct 
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion, Melvin must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, 
the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." 
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those 
objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the 
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or 
retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 
730 (1978). Melvin cannot meet his burden in this case. 
In imposing sentence, the district court recited the objectives of 
sentencing and indicated it considered "everything" in deciding what sentence to 
impose. (Tr., p.174, Ls.4-17, p.175, Ls.3-4.) On appeal, Melvin claims the 
district court imposed an excessive sentence given his "relatively minor criminal 
history," "mental illness," the "unusual" facts of this case, and "the fact that his 
psychosexual evaluation places him at a moderate low risk to reoffend." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) All of this information was, however, before the 
district court and considered by the court in imposing sentence, and none of the 
information compels a lower sentence. That Melvin disagrees with how the 
district court weighed the evidence and balanced the objectives of sentencing 
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does not show an abuse of discretion. See State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 
879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011) ("In this case, Windom essentially asks this Court 
to re-weigh the evidence presented to the district court and reach a different 
conclusion . . .. However, our role is not to reweigh the evidence considered by 
the district court; our role is to determine whether reasonable minds could reach 
the same conclusion as did the district court."). 
Based on the nature of the offense, Melvin's character, and the objectives 
of sentencing, a unified 12-year sentence with five years fixed is not excessive 
under any reasonable view of the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Melvin guilty of lewd conduct. 
DATED this 21 st day of September, 2015. 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
V 
Deputy Attorney General 
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